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Inspired by the work of Ghadafi and Groth (ASIACRYPT 2017) on a certain type of computational
hardness assumptions in cyclic groups (which they call “target assumptions”), we initiate an analogous
work on another type of hardness assumptions, namely the “knowledge-of-exponent” assumptions (KEAs).
Originally introduced to construct practical encryption schemes secure against chosen ciphertext attacks,
KEAs have subsequently been used primarily to construct succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge
(SNARKs), and proved to be inherent to such constructions. Since SNARKs (and their zero-knowledge
variant, zk-SNARKs) are already used in practice in such systems as the Zcash digital currency, it can
be expected that the use of KEAs will increase in the future, which makes it important to have a good
understanding of those assumptions. Using a proof technique first introduced by Bellare and Palacio (but
acknowledged by them as being due to Halevi), we first investigate the internal structure of the q-power
knowledge-of-exponent (q-PKE) family of assumptions introduced by Groth, which is thus far the most
general variant of KEAs. We then introduce a generalisation of the q-PKE family, and show that it can be
simplified.
1 Introduction
Cryptography can be broadly defined as the de-
sign of systems, called cryptographic systems or
cryptographic schemes, that are capable of maintain-
ing their functionality in the presence of adversarial
entities that attempt to make them deviate from
their intended behaviour [6]. In the classical cryp-
tographic task of encryption, for instance, a crypto-
graphic system called an encryption scheme is used
by two parties to exchange messages over a pub-
lic channel in such a way as to make it impossible
for any third party to obtain the contents of the
exchanged messages. This property, called privacy
or confidentiality, must be maintained regardless of
the strategy employed by such a third party in its
attempts.
A question that immediately arises when consid-
ering such schemes is how one should evaluate their
“security”, i.e., whether and to what extent they
satisfy the privacy requirement. The modern ap-
proach to this question is based on computational
complexity theory and was pioneered around 1980
[2, 7]. It asserts that such schemes should be consid-
ered secure if (and only if) any information about a
plaintext that is contained in a corresponding ci-
phertext cannot be “efficiently” obtained by any
third party.
However, in the current state of our knowledge
in complexity theory, the security of most cryp-
tographic systems cannot be proved in that sense
unconditionally, and must be proved under the as-
sumption that certain computational tasks are diffi-
cult (in a suitable sense). Of course, in order to in-
crease our confidence in the security of such systems,
it is necessary to increase our confidence in the va-
lidity of the assumptions under which their security
is proved. Traditionally, this was done by admitting
as valid the assumption that a problem is difficult
when a considerable amount of research effort had
been devoted to the search of efficient solutions to
it without any (or much) success. In recent years,
however, new assumptions are introduced very fre-
quently, and, as pointed out for instance by Naor [9],
it is sometimes not clear whether proving the secu-
rity of a system under a new assumption is much
different from simply assuming that the system is
secure.
This proliferation of new assumptions raises ques-
tions both for cryptographers, who design new cryp-
tographic systems, and for cryptanalysts, who at-
tempt to “break” those systems by showing that
the underlying assumptions are in fact false. For
the former, what are the best assumptions on which
to base their constructions? And for the latter, what
are the best assumptions on which to focus their ef-
forts? A solution to these dilemmas was proposed
by Ghadafi and Groth in 2017 [5] for a class of as-
sumptions which they call “target assumptions” and
which includes for instance the well-known compu-
tational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption [2]. Sec-
ondly, they identify a small subclass of assumptions
(called “Uber-assumptions”) within the large class,
and show that if all the Uber-assumptions hold, then
all the target assumptions hold as well.
Such a result is useful both to cryptographers and
to cryptanalysts. Cryptographers can use any tar-
get assumption as the basis of their systems, and
be confident that they will remain secure at least
as long as none of the Uber-assumptions is broken
(since if their chosen assumption is false, then at
least one Uber-assumption is false as well). Crypt-
analysts, meanwhile, have a higher chance of success
if they focus on the Uber-assumptions, since they
give a small set of assumptions that is guaranteed
to contain at least one false assumption (unless all
the assumptions in the large class are true, in which
case there is no hope of proving that any assumption
is false anyway).
In this thesis, we attempt to apply a sim-
ilar analysis to another type of assumptions,
called “knowledge-of-exponent assumptions”
(KEAs). Despite questions surrounding their non-
falsifiability [9], KEAs have been used to construct
systems for which no construction under falsifiable
assumptions is known (or even possible), such as
succinct non-interactive zero-knowledge protocols
[8, 3]. Moreover, at least one such construction (a
variant of the construction of [3, 10]) is already
being used in a practical system, namely the Zcash
digital currency [11]. Since such protocols require
KEAs or other non-falsifiable assumptions [4], it can
be expected that KEAs will become increasingly
popular in the future, which makes it all the more
important to have a solid understanding of them.
After reviewing some definitions and notation in
Chapter 2, we discuss in Chapter 3 the q-power
knowledge-of-exponent (q-PKE) family of assump-
tions introduced by Groth [8] and study its inter-
nal structure. We show in particular that, under
a certain decisional assumption, the q-PKE family
is increasing, i.e., that (q + 1)-PKE implies q-PKE.
In Chapter 4, we introduce a class of KEAs, which
we call rational knowledge-of-exponent assumptions
(RKEAs), as a generalisation of the q-PKE fam-
ily, and, as a first step towards identifying Uber-
assumptions for this class, we show that it can be
slightly simplified (i.e., implied by a slightly smaller
subclass).
2 Preliminaries
Algorithms Unless otherwise stated, all the algo-
rithms in this thesis take as input 1κ, for a security
parameter κ, and possibly additional inputs, and
run in time polynomial in κ (this implicitly requires
all inputs to have size polynomial in κ). Algorithms
may be non-uniform and/or probabilistic.
To ease notation, 1κ will often be omitted (e.g.,
for an algorithm A we will often write A(x) instead
of A(1κ, x) to denote its execution on input x and
security parameter κ). For two probabilistic algo-
rithms A and B we denote by A||B their joint ex-
ecution on a common input and random tape, and
we write (u; v) ← (A||B)(x) to say that the output
of A on input x is assigned to u and the output of
B on the same input x and the same random tape is
assigned to v.
Group generators Throughout this thesis, we
will define assumptions relative to a given group gen-
erator, as defined in [5].
Definition 2.1 (Group generators). A group gen-
erator is a uniform probabilistic algorithm G which
on security parameter κ outputs group parameters
(Gp, g), where
• p is a prime with |p| = Θ(κ);
• Gp is (a description of) a (cyclic) group of order
p, with canonical representations of group ele-
ments as binary strings and efficient algorithms
for performing the group operation and decid-
ing membership; and
• g is a random generator of Gp, chosen uniformly
over all the generators.
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As in [5], given a group Gp, a generator g, and
an element x ∈ Fp, we will denote by [x] the el-
ement of Gp with discrete logarithm x relative to
the generator g and the group operation of Gp, i.e.,
[x] := g ◦ g ◦ · · · ◦ g for x terms. Thus the genera-
tor g is [1] and the identity element is [0]. We will
also denote the group operation additively, so that
we have [x + y] = [x] + [y] and [kx] = k[x] (where
k[x] := [x] + [x] + · · ·+ [x] for k terms).
3 The q-PKE family of assumptions
In this chapter we investigate the internal struc-
ture of the q-power knowledge-of-exponent (q-PKE)
family of assumptions, which was introduced in [8]
as a generalisation of KEAs that had been intro-
duced previously. These assumptions are as follows.
Assumption 3.1 (q-PKE). Let G be a group gener-
ator, and q ∈ N. We say that q-PKE holds (relative
to G) if for every non-uniform probabilistic adver-
sary A there is a non-uniform probabilistic extractor
χA such that
Pr
[
(Gp, [1])← G;x, α ← Fp;
σ := (Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q], [α], [αx], . . . , [αxq]);(
([u], [v]); (k0, . . . , kq)
)← (A||χA)(σ) :(
[v] = α[u]
) ∧ ([u] ̸= ∑qi=0ki[xi])] ≤ negl.
It was shown in [1] that 1-PKE implies 0-PKE; the
proof there readily extends to show that, for any q,
q-PKE implies 0-PKE.
Theorem 3.2 (Generalisation of Proposition 2
from [1]). Let G be a group generator, and q ∈ N.
If q-PKE holds for G, then 0-PKE holds for G.
A natural question is then to ask whether this can
be generalised to show that in general (q + 1)-PKE
implies q-PKE. We show that this is the case un-
der certain circumstances, namely, when a decisional
version of the Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption
holds.
Assumption 3.3 (q-decisional Diffie-Hellman ex-
ponent (q-DDHE)). Let G be a group generator, A
be a non-uniform probabilistic adversary, q ∈ N∗,
and b ∈ {0, 1}, and consider the following experi-
ment Expq-ddhe-bG,A (κ).
• (Gp, [1])← G;x, r ← Fp.
• If b = 0, then σ := (Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [xq], [r]);
else, σ := (Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q], [xq+1]).
• b′ ← A(σ).
• Output b′.
We let
Advq-ddheG,A (κ) :=∣∣∣Pr[Expq-ddhe-1G,A (κ) = 1]− Pr[Expq-ddhe-0G,A (κ) = 1]∣∣∣
be the advantage of A (in q-DDHE) relative to G,
and we say that q-DDHE holds in G if every ad-
versary has negligible advantage, i.e., if for ev-
ery non-uniform probabilistic adversary A, we have
Advq-ddheG,A ≤ negl.
Theorem 3.4. Let G be a group generator, and q ∈
N∗. If q-DDHE and (q + 1)-PKE hold for G, then
q-PKE holds for G.
4 Rational KEAs (RKEAs)
In this section, we propose a definition of a large
class of assumptions, with the goal of capturing not
only the KEAs that have appeared in the literature
thus far, but also those that are likely to appear in
the future. We then show that this large class is
implied by a slightly smaller subclass.
We call these assumptions rational knowledge-of-
exponent assumptions (RKEAs), and define them as
a generalisation of the q-PKE family, analogously to
how target assumptions are defined in [5]. Namely,
instead of using only powers of x in the exponent,
we allow arbitrary rational functions of several vari-
ables. We start by defining a very general notion
of non-interactive knowledge assumptions (NIKAs)
analogous to the non-interactive computational as-
sumptions of [5].
Definition 4.1 (Non-interactive knowledge as-
sumptions (NIKAs)). A non-interactive knowledge
assumption consists of an instance generator I, a
verifier V, and a knowledge verifier V, defined as
follows.
• (pub, priv) ← I: I is a uniform probabilis-
tic algorithm which, on input 1κ (where κ is
a security parameter), outputs a pair of pub-
lic/private information (pub, priv). We omit the
input 1κ as usual.
• 0/1 ← V(pub, priv, sol): V is a uniform deter-
ministic algorithm which, on input (pub, priv)
and a purported solution sol, outputs 1 if the
solution is “correct” and 0 otherwise.
• 0/1 ← V(pub, priv, sol, sec): V is a uni-
form deterministic algorithm which, on input
(pub, priv, sol) and a purported “secret” sec,
outputs 1 if the secret is “correct” and 0 other-
wise.
We say that the assumption holds if for any non-
uniform probabilistic algorithm A (the adversary)
there is a non-uniform probabilistic algorithm χA
(the knowledge extractor, or just the extractor) such
that
Pr
[
(pub, priv)← I; (sol; sec)← (A||χA)(pub) :
V(pub, priv, sol) = 1 ∧
V(pub, priv, sol, sec) = 0] ≤ negl.
Definition 4.2 (Rational knowledge-of-exponent
assumptions (RKEAs)). Given d,m, n ∈ N∗ and a
group generator G, we say that an NIKA (I,V,V)
is a (d,m, n)-RKEA if there is a uniform probabilis-
tic algorithm Icore such that I, V and V are of the
following forms.
• (pub, priv)← I:
– (Gp, [1])← G.
–
({
ai(X)
bi(X)
}n
i=1
, pub′, priv′
)
← Icore(Gp),
where the ais and bis are polynomials in
m variables and of total degree at most d.
– x← Fmp conditioned on bi(x) ̸= 0 for all i.
– α← Fp.
– pub :=
(
Gp,
{[
ai(x)
bi(x)
]}n
i=1
,
{[
α·ai(x)
bi(x)
]}n
i=1
,{
ai(X)
bi(X)
}n
i=1
, pub′
)
.
– Return
(
pub, priv := ([1],x, α, priv′)
)
.
• 0/1← V(pub, priv, sol = ([u], [v])): if [v] = α[u],
return 1; else, return 0.
• 0/1 ← V(pub, priv, sol, sec = (k1, . . . , kn)): if∑n
i=1 ki
[ai(x)
bi(x)
]
= [u], return 1; else, return 0.
Definition 4.3 (Simple RKEAs). We say that an
RKEA is simple if bi(X) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n,
i.e., all the rational functions output by Icore are
just polynomials.
Theorem 4.4. For any (d,m, n)-RKEA A =
(IA,VA,VA) there is an (nd,m, n)-simple RKEA
B = (IB,VB,VB) such that B implies A.
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and b ∈ {0, 1}, and consider the following experi-
ment Expq-ddhe-bG,A (κ).
• (Gp, [1])← G;x, r ← Fp.
• If b = 0, then σ := (Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [xq], [r]);
else, σ := (Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q], [xq+1]).
• b′ ← A(σ).
• Output b′.
We let
Advq-ddheG,A (κ) :=∣∣∣Pr[Expq-ddhe-1G,A (κ) = 1]− Pr[Expq-ddhe-0G,A (κ) = 1]∣∣∣
be the advantage of A (in q-DDHE) relative to G,
and we say that q-DDHE holds in G if every ad-
versary has negligible advantage, i.e., if for ev-
ery non-uniform probabilistic adversary A, we have
Advq-ddheG,A ≤ negl.
Theorem 3.4. Let G be a group generator, and q ∈
N∗. If q-DDHE and (q + 1)-PKE hold for G, then
q-PKE holds for G.
4 Rational KEAs (RKEAs)
In this section, we propose a definition of a large
class of assumptions, with the goal of capturing not
only the KEAs that have appeared in the literature
thus far, but also those that are likely to appear in
the future. We then show that this large class is
implied by a slightly smaller subclass.
We call these assumptions rational knowledge-of-
exponent assumptions (RKEAs), and define them as
a generalisation of the q-PKE family, analogously to
how target assumptions are defined in [5]. Namely,
instead of using only powers of x in the exponent,
we allow arbitrary rational functions of several vari-
ables. We start by defining a very general notion
of non-interactive knowledge assumptions (NIKAs)
analogous to the non-interactive computational as-
sumptions of [5].
Definition 4.1 (Non-interactive knowledge as-
sumptions (NIKAs)). A non-interactive knowledge
assumption consists of an instance generator I, a
verifier V, and a knowledge verifier V, defined as
follows.
• (pub, priv) ← I: I is a uniform probabilis-
tic algorithm which, on input 1κ (where κ is
a security parameter), outputs a pair of pub-
lic/private information (pub, priv). We omit the
input 1κ as usual.
• 0/1 ← V(pub, priv, sol): V is a uniform deter-
ministic algorithm which, on input (pub, priv)
and a purported solution sol, outputs 1 if the
solution is “correct” and 0 otherwise.
• 0/1 ← V(pub, priv, sol, sec): V is a uni-
form deterministic algorithm which, on input
(pub, priv, sol) and a purported “secret” sec,
outputs 1 if the secret is “correct” and 0 other-
wise.
We say that the assumption holds if for any non-
uniform probabilistic algorithm A (the adversary)
there is a non-uniform probabilistic algorithm χA
(the knowledge extractor, or just the extractor) such
that
Pr
[
(pub, priv)← I; (sol; sec)← (A||χA)(pub) :
V(pub, priv, sol) = 1 ∧
V(pub, priv, sol, sec) = 0] ≤ negl.
Definition 4.2 (Rational knowledge-of-exponent
assumptions (RKEAs)). Given d,m, n ∈ N∗ and a
group generator G, we say that an NIKA (I,V,V)
is a (d,m, n)-RKEA if there is a uniform probabilis-
tic algorithm Icore such that I, V and V are of the
following forms.
• (pub, priv)← I:
– (Gp, [1])← G.
–
({
ai(X)
bi(X)
}n
i=1
, pub′, priv′
)
← Icore(Gp),
where the ais and bis are polynomials in
m variables and of total degree at most d.
– x← Fmp conditioned on bi(x) ̸= 0 for all i.
– α← Fp.
– pub :=
(
Gp,
{[
ai(x)
bi(x)
]}n
i=1
,
{[
α·ai(x)
bi(x)
]}n
i=1
,{
ai(X)
bi(X)
}n
i=1
, pub′
)
.
– Return
(
pub, priv := ([1],x, α, priv′)
)
.
• 0/1← V(pub, priv, sol = ([u], [v])): if [v] = α[u],
return 1; else, return 0.
• 0/1 ← V(pub, priv, sol, sec = (k1, . . . , kn)): if∑n
i=1 ki
[ai(x)
bi(x)
]
= [u], return 1; else, return 0.
Definition 4.3 (Simple RKEAs). We say that an
RKEA is simple if bi(X) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n,
i.e., all the rational functions output by Icore are
just polynomials.
Theorem 4.4. For any (d,m, n)-RKEA A =
(IA,VA,VA) there is an (nd,m, n)-simple RKEA
B = (IB,VB,VB) such that B implies A.
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